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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Assuming the filing of a timely notice of appeal, this 
court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-3(3) (j) and 78-2(a)-3(2) (k) (1992). However, as set 
forth below, the notice of appeal in this unlawful detainer 
action was not filed within ten days of the lower court's summary 
judgment order. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction. 
See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The threshold issue is whether this court has 
jurisdiction. Assuming that the court reaches the merits of the 
appeal, the issue is: Did the district court err in ruling that 
the Ground Lease was duly terminated prior to any alleged offset 
or waiver? Standard of Review: Because this issue was decided 
on a motion for summary, the appellate court reviews the facts in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment 
and affirms a grant of summary judgment only if the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First American 
Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank. 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 
(Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative provision in this appeal is Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(a). That rule provides in pertinent 
part: 
[W]hen a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer 
action, the notice of appeal required by rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 10 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Assuming that this court reaches the merits of the 
appeal, the determinative statute is the Utah Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-1, et seq. (1992). A 
copy of the statute is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Iron County, Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite. 
Pursuant to its amended complaint, the plaintiff, Brian Head Ski, 
Ltd. (the "Plaintiff") sought an order confirming and declaring 
that the Ground Lease had been terminated and that neither the 
defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. (the "Defendant") nor any 
other parties claiming an interest under the Defendant had any 
interest in the property or the right to any ingress or egress to 
the property.1 On April 26, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a motion 
for summary judgment. The motion was opposed only by the 
Defendant.2 The motion was granted by the district court on 
September 10, 1993. The order was filed on September 13, 1993. 
A copy of the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
because the names of the parties are so similar (Brian Head 
Ski and Brian Head Leasing), this brief will use the terms 
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" to avoid confusion. 
2The other defendants in the matter did not oppose the 
motion and did not join in the Defendant's appeal. 
2 
Judgment is attached as Addendum B. On October 7, 1993, the 
Defendant filed its untimely notice of appeal from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In its memorandum in support of summary judgment, the 
Plaintiff listed the following undisputed material facts. The 
Defendant did not specifically controvert any of these facts, as 
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). A copy of the 
Memorandum of Brian Head Ski, Ltd. in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment is attached as Addendum C. 
1. On or about September 4, 1978, Brian Head 
Enterprises, Inc. ("BH Enterprises")3, entered into a Ground 
Lease Agreement (the "Ground Lease") with the Defendant. 
Addendum C at 1 1. 
2. The Ground Lease related to certain real property 
upon which is constructed a seasonal snack bar and fast food 
restaurant for the Brian Head Ski Resort (the "Property"). Id. 
at 1 2. 
3. The Ground Lease provided, among other 
obligations, that the Defendant pay annual rent in the amount of 
One Hundred Dollars. Id. at 1 2. 
3BH Enterprises is the predecessor-in-interest of the 
Plaintiff. 
3 
4. The Defendant failed to pay the annual rent as 
required by the Ground Lease for twelve consecutive years. Id. 
at 1 4. 
5. On or about July 26, 1991, notice was given by 
certified mail (return receipt requested) to the Defendant 
(through its general partner Harold Jensen, Jr.), that the 
Defendant was in default of its obligations under the Ground 
Lease, and that the Defendant's rights under the Ground Lease 
would be terminated without further notice unless the default was 
cured and payment made within three days after service of said 
notice upon the Defendant. Id. at 1 8. 
6. Jensen acknowledged receipt of the certified 
mailing of the notice on July 30, 1991. Id. at 1 9. 
7. The said notice was also posted upon the Property. 
Id. at 1 7. 
8. The Defendant made no attempt to cure the default 
within the time period specified in the notice and Jensen had no 
"answer" or explanation as to why it did not. Id. at 1 11. 
9. When the Defendant failed to cure the default 
within the time period specified in the notice, an action was 
filed on August 9, 1991, to confirm that the Defendant's rights 
under the Ground Lease were terminated, and that the Defendant 
and any subtenants of the Defendant were in unlawful detainer of 
the Property. Id. at 1 12. 
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10. On May 21, 1992, the Plaintiff as assignee of 
Brian Head North Condominium Development Corporation, acquired 
all of the assets (but not the liabilities) of the Brian Head Ski 
Resort. Included in those assets was the fee title to the 
Property and BH Enterprise's interest in the previously 
terminated Ground Lease. Id. at 1 25. 
11. At the time the Defendant purported to pay taxes 
on the Property, the Ground Lease had already been terminated and 
funds were in escrow from the Plaintiff's purchase of the 
Property to pay all real property taxes on the Property. The 
Plaintiff paid the 1992 real property taxes on the Property. Id. 
at 1 34. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The notice of appeal in this unlawful detainer case was 
not filed within ten days as required by Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a). Accordingly this court is without jurisdiction. 
Assuming that the appellate court reaches the merits of 
the appeal, the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
The district court properly held that any alleged offset in this 
case came after the Ground Lease had already been terminated. 
Accordingly, the district court acted appropriately in granting 
the motion for summary judgment. Because the Ground Lease had 
been terminated, the defendant's arguments regarding waiver and 
equity (all of which involve actions taken after the lease was 
5 
already terminated) were also properly rejected by the district 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND THEREFORE 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that "when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within ten days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from." The timely filing of a notice of appeal is 
a jurisdictional requirement. If a timely notice of appeal is 
not filed, this court must dismiss the appeal. "Whether by [the 
court's] own discovery or by a motion of a party, dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction will be considered at any stage of the 
proceedings when it appears that jurisdiction, is in fact, 
lacking." Silva v. Dep't of Employment Sec. 786 P.2d 246, 247 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, the district court signed the order 
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on September 10, 
1993. The order was filed on September 13, 1993. Because this 
case is an action for unlawful detainer, a notice of appeal had 
to be filed no later than September 23, 1993. The notice of 
appeal in this case was not filed until October 7, 1993. Because 
the notice of appeal was not filed within ten days as required by 
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Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the notice of appeal is 
defective and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
appeal. 
II. EVEN IF THE COURT CONSIDERS THE MERITS OF THE MATTERf THE 
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
Even if the court considers the merits of this appeal, 
it must affirm the decision of the district court. The 
undisputed facts establish that the Ground Lease had been 
terminated due to the Defendant's admitted failure to timely pay 
ground rents due after receiving notice and opportunity to cure. 
The district court specifically found: 
The Ground Lease at issue was duly terminated 
prior to any alleged offset by payment of 
taxes or cure by defendant Brian Head 
Leasing, Ltd., and defendant Brian Head 
Leasing, Ltd., or any parties claiming 
through it, have no interest in the Property 
which was formerly subject to the Ground 
Lease. 
Addendum B at \ 2. 
The Defendant alleged an offset or defense to 
termination of the Ground Lease in that it asserts that it paid 
property taxes that should have been paid by BH Enterprises. 
This payment of property taxes was made by Jensen by personal 
check on February 3, 1992, some seven months after the Ground 
Lease had already been terminated in August of 1991. 
Thus, as the district court properly hold, the alleged payment of 
taxes by Jensen is legally insufficient to prevent summary 
j udgment. 
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The Ground Lease had already been terminated in August 
of 1991, and because of such termination, there was no existing 
covenant on the part of the Plaintiff or its predecessor to pay 
any taxes. The Ground Lease no longer existed. Termination of 
the Ground Lease became effective after a notice of default was 
sent on July 26, 1991, received by the Defendant on July 30, 
1991, and no cure of the default was made during the time period 
specified. 
The lessee is entitled to the time specified in the 
notice to which to cure the default, prior to taking effect of 
the forfeiture, but the notice terminates the lease after 
expiration of the specified period. 51 C.J.S., "Landlord & 
Tenant" § 114(3). 
Under common law, failure to cure a default notice 
which also states that the lease will be terminated without 
further notice is effective. In Whitman v. Cearley, 251 S.W.2d 
960 (Tex Ct. App. 1952), a landlord's letter advised the tenant 
that unless the full amount of delinquent rent was paid within 
two weeks, the lease would be canceled and appropriate legal 
proceedings immediately instituted. The court held that this 
letter automatically effected cancellation of the lease at the 
expiration of such time, when the rent due was not paid, and no 
furtiier action by landlord to terminate the lease was "necessary 
or appropriate." Id. at 961. This is in accordance with the 
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terms of the Ground Lease in question which provides in Article 
VI: 
"The Lessee hereby covenants and agrees that 
if a default shall be made in the payment of 
rent....then said Lessee shall become a 
tenant at sufferance, hereby waiving all 
right of notice, and the Lessor shall be 
entitled immediately to re-enter and retake 
possession of the demised premises.11 
The Defendant's general partner, Mr. Jensen, drafted the 
foregoing provision. (Jensen Dep. p. 16.) It is clear that the 
Defendant received far more notice and opportunity to cure than 
was required under the Ground Lease. 
Even if the Defendant were to argue that some 
additional notice of termination is required, the unequivocal act 
of filing this eviction suit would be effective as such 
additional notice. Enders v. Wesley W. Hubbard & Sons. Inc., 513 
P.2d 992 (Idaho 1973). 
Because the lease had already been terminated, the 
district court properly held that, as a matter of law, the so-
called offset by the Defendant was immaterial. In addition, the 
Defendant's arguments regarding waiver and equity are also 
immaterial. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff waived its 
rights because it "filed the complaint for unlawful detainer in 
August 1991, and thereafter allowed the lessee to stay in 
possession of the premises." Brief of Appellant at 8. This is a 
curious argument. As a matter of law, once an unlawful detainer 
lawsuit had been filed, there was nothing for the Plaintiff to do 
9 
short of taking the law into its own hands and forcibly evicting 
the Defendant. The district court properly held that, as a 
matter of law, the actions taken by the plaintiff after the 
unlawful detainer suit had been filed did not constitute waiver. 
Finally, the Defendant argues that the district court 
should have !ldo[ne] equity by recognizing that it would be fair 
and equitable to allow the payment of taxes as a setoff for the 
rent." Brief of Appellant at 9. However, the court properly 
held that the alleged payment of taxes came after the lease had 
been already terminated and therefore, as a matter of law, could 
not constitute a valid setoff. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Brian Head Ski Ltd., 
respectfully requests that this court dismiss the appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, affirm the decision of 
the district court in this case. 
DATED this 3* day of March, 1994. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
J4me^ S. J^rdin 
Larry G. Moore 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for Brian Head Ski, 
Ltd. Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Tab A 
78-36-9 JUDICIAL CODE 508 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the 
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be adjudi-
cated between the parties, the court shall require the 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection 
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur-
ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi-
cating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
1987 
78-36-9. Proof r equ i r ed by plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry 
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be re-
quired to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, tha t he was peace-
ably in the actual possession at the time of the forc-
ible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may 
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those 
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one 
whole year continuously next before the commence-
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is 
a bar to the proceedings. 1953 
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for res t i tu t ion , d a m a g e s , 
a n d r en t — Immed ia t e en fo rcemen t — 
Treb le d a m a g e s . 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condi-
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defen-
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com-
plaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction 
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately. 1992 
78-36-11. Time for appea l . 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either 
party may, within ten days, appeal from the judg-
ment rendered. 
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 
through 78-38-16, any party may appeal from the 
judgment rendered within three days. 1992 
78-36-12. Exclusion of t enan t wi thou t judicial 
process p roh ib i t ed — A b a n d o n e d 
premises excep ted . 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant 's premises m any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. i»si 
78-36-12.3. Definit ions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant 's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p remises — Re tak ing 
and r e ren t ing by o w n e r — Liabili ty of 
t e n a n t — P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t e n a n t 
left on p remises . 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and at tempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plu.s a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and 
has left personal property on the premises, the owner 
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has 
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has 
made no reasonable effort to recover it. the owner 
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward 
any amount the tenant owes Any money left over 
from the sale of the property shall he handled as spec-
ified in Section 78-4-1-1H Nothing contained in this 
act shall be in dorogahon o! or alter the owner M 
rights under Title 38. C'hapte: 3 IJ«K6 
507 JUDICIAL CODE 78-36-8.5 
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 1953 
78-36-6. Notice to qui t — How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may 
be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant person-
ally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or 
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place 
of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a 
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion 
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business; 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can-
not be found at the place of residence, then by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the 
leased property; or 
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the 
nuisance is issued by the court as provided in 
Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties 
present shall be on notice that the abatement by 
eviction order is issued and immediately effective 
or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as 
provided in Subsections (1) through (4). 
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in 
the same manner. 1992 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the prem-
ises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occu-
pation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
Shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, 
Except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any-
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for 
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been 
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any 
of the parties served with process or appearing in the 
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered 
against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the prem-
ises in controversy after the service of any notice as 
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was 
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the 
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after 
the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made par-
ties to the action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a nec-
essary party defendant only in an abatement by evic-
tion action for an unlawful drug house as provided in 
Section 78-38-13. " iinr> 
78-36-8. Allegat ions permi t ted in compla in t — 
Time for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of 
summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set 
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence 
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible 
fentry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim 
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation 
Of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer 
Charged is after default in the payment of rent, the 
Complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The 
Court shall indorse on the summons the number of 
days within which the defendant is requhvd to ap-
pear and defend the action, which shail not he less 
than three or more than 20 days from the date of 
Service. The court may authorize service hv publica-
tion or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is 
complete one week after publication. Service by mail 
is complete three days after mailing. The summons 
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of 
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
cases. 1987 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
nat ive remedies . 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint 
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may 
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be 
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons 
who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The court shall approve the 
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons and shall inform the 
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and pro-
cedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and pro-
cedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a 
possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer ac-
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or 
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in 
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the 
defendant, within three days of the service of the 
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees, as provided in the rental 
agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if 
he executes and files a counter bond in the form 
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who 
own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at 
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the fil-
ing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall 
approve the bond in an amount that is the proba-
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages 
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant 
has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a por-
tion of the defendant's total bond. 
<c> The defendant, upon demand, shall be 
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expira-
tion of three days from the date the defendant is 
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs pos-
session bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with 
a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the prop-
erty is situated shall return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
>•> If the deft-p.dant demand* a hearing under Sub-
section '2»(c', and if the court rules after the hearing 
that the p;ainti<Tis •»:?•.;'led to possession of the prop-
erty. KK? c.in^Lihie or sheriff shall promptly return 
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78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
78-36-7 Necessary- parties defendant 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
native remedies. 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, 
and rent — Immediate enforcement 
— Treble damages. 
78-36-11. Time for appeal. 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of ten-
ant left on premises. 
78-36-1. "Forc ib le e n t r y " defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who ei-
ther: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circum-
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real prop-
erty, turns out by force, threats or menacing con-
duct the party in actual possession. 1953 
78-36-2. "Forc ib le d e t a i n e r " defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio-
lence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was ac-
quired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of 
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully 
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three 
days to surrender the same to such former occu-
pant. The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within 
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in 
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands. 1953 
78-36-3. Unlawful d e t a i n e r by t enan t for te rm 
less than life. 
( 1 ) A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe-
riod for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expira-
tion of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved 
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-
son or by subtenant after the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner, 
his designated agent, or any successor in es-
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five 
days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi-
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in 
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him and 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days 
after service. Within three days after the service 
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person interested in its contin-
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-
formed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nu i sance in Subsec-
tion 78-36-3(1 )(d) a r e not appl icable to nu i sance ac-
t ions provided in Sections*78-38-9 th rough 78-38-16 
only. 1992 
78-36-4. Right of t e n a n t of ag r i cu l tu ra l l ands to 
hold over . 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, 
where the tenant has held over and retained posses-
sion for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to 
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permis-
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the 
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not 
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; 
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be 
taken and construed as a consent on the part of the 
tenant to hold for another year. 1981 
78-36-5. Remedies ava i lab le to t enan t aga ins t 
u n d e r t e n a n t . 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to (hose 
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
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Section 
78-35-2. Recommitment. 
78-35-3. Recommitment after discharge forbid-
den — Exceptions. 
78-35-4. Refusing to exhibit authority for deten-
tion — Penalty. 
78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant. 
78-35-6. Judgment of ouster — Costs — Penalty 
by fine where state is party. 
78-35-7. Judgment against director of corpora-
tion — Of induction in favor of person 
entitled. 
78-35-8. Action for damages because of usurpa-
tion — Limitation of action. 
78-35-9. Mandamus and prohibition — Judg-
ment. 
78-35-10. Disobedience of writ — Punishment. 
78-35-1. Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow 
writ of h a b e a s c o r p u s . 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a 
member of a court, who wrongfully and willfully re-
fuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever 
proper application for the same has been made shall 
forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the 
party thereby aggrieved. 1953 
78-35-2. Recommitment 
In all cases where it is claimed that a person is 
illegally or wrongfully restrained or deprived of his 
liberty, where such restraint or imprisonment is for a 
criminal offense and there is not sufficient cause for 
discharge (even though the commitment may have 
been informally made or without due authority, or 
the process may have been executed by a person not 
duly authorized) the court or judge may make a new 
commitment, or admit the party to bail, if the case is 
bailable. And all material witnesses shall also be re-
quired to enter into a recognizance to appear at the 
same time and place and not depart therefrom with-
out leave. All such papers must be filed in the clerk's 
office where the same are made returnable. 1953 
78-35-3. Recommitment after discharge forbid-
den — Exceptions. 
No person who has been discharged by order of the 
court or judge upon habeas corpus shall be again im-
prisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same 
cause, except in the following cases: 
(1) if he has been discharged from custody on a 
criminal charge and is afterward committed for 
the same offense by legal order or process. 
(2) if, after discharge for defect lofi proof or for 
any defect of the process, warrant or commitment 
in a criminal case, the prisoner is again arrested 
on sufficient proof and committed by legal pro-
cess for the same offense. 1953 
78-35-4. Refusing to exhibit authority for deten-
tion — Penalty. 
A person refusing to deliver a copy of the legal pro-
cess by which he detains the plaintiff in custody to 
anyone who demands such copy for the purpose of 
taking out a writ of habeas corpus shall forfeit not 
exceeding $200 to the plaintiff. 1953 
78-35-5. Pena l t i e s for wrongful ac t s of defen-
dan t . 
If the defendant attempts to evade the service of 
the writ of habeas corpus, or if the defendant or any 
officer willfully fails to comply with the legal duties 
imposed upon him, or if he disobeys the order of dis-
charge, he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and 
shall also forfeit to the person aggrieved not more 
than $5,000. Any person knowingly aiding in or abet-
ting invalidation of this section is subject to the same 
punishment and forfeiture. i9*i 
78-35-6. J u d g m e n t of ous t e r — Costs — Pena l ty 
by fine w h e r e s ta te is par ty . 
When a defendant is found guilty of usurping, in-
truding into or unlawfully holding or exercising an 
office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall be ren-
dered that such defendant be ousted and altogether 
excluded therefrom, and that the relator recover his 
costs. The court may also, in its discretion, in actions 
to which the state is a party impose upon the defen-
dant a fine not exceeding $5,000, which fine when 
collected must be paid into the state treasury. 1953 
78-35-7. Judgment against director of corpora-
tion — Of induction in favor of person 
entitled. 
When the action is against a director of a corpora-
tion, and the court finds that, at his election, either 
illegal votes were received or legal votes were re-
jected, or both, sufficient to change the result, judg-
ment may be rendered that the defendant be ousted, 
and judgment of induction entered in favor of the per-
son who was entitled to be declared elected at such 
election. 1953 
78-35-8. Action for damages because of usurpa-
tion — Limitation of action. 
Such person may, at any time within one year after 
the date of such judgment, bring an action against 
the party ousted and recover the damages he sus-
tained by reason of such usurpation. 1953 
78-35-9. Mandamus and prohibition — Judg-
ment. 
In any proceeding to obtain a writ of mandate or 
prohibition, if judgment is given for the applicant, he 
may recover the damages which he has sustained, as 
found by the jury, or as may be determined by the 
court, or referees upon a reference ordered, together 
with costs; and for such damages and costs an execu-
tion may issue, and a peremptory mandate must also 
be awarded without delay. 1953 
78-35-10. Disobedience of writ — Punishment. 
When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ of pro-
hibition has been issued and directed to an inferior 
tribunal, corporation, board or person, if it appears to 
the court that any member of such tribunal, corpora-
tion, board or person upon whom such writ has been 
personally served has, without just excuse, refused or 
neglected to obey the same, the court may, upon mo-
tion, impose a fine not exceeding $500. In cases of 
persistence in a refusal of obedience, the court may 
order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is 
obeyed, and may make any orders necessary and 
proper for the complete enforcement of the writ. 1953 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT . -
PY M - ^ 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH" 
OOOoo 
BRIAN HEAD SKI, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
BRIAN HEAD LEASING, LTD., 
RUSTY'S RESTAURANTS, INC., a 
corporation dba SUNBURST or 
SUNBURST RESTAURANT, and 
RUSSELL AIKEN aka "RUSTY" 
AIKEN, 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 913000-^298 
Judge Braithwaite 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
THIS MATTER came for hearing before the Court on May 
18, 1993, at which time the Court heard oral arguments on the 
Motion For Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Brian Head Ski, 
Ltd. The plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. was represented by Larry 
G. Moore, the defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. was represented 
by Michael W. Park, and the defendant Rusty's Restaurant, Inc. 
was represented by Patrick H. Fenton. The defendant Rusty's 
Restaurant, Inc. did not take a position on the Motion. At the 
request of its counsel, Mr. Park, the Court granted defendant 
Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. additional time to file a Supplemental 
Memorandum, to which the plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. has filed 
a Reply to Supplemental Memorandum. 
The Court having fully considered all of the pleadings 
on file, and the arguments of counsel, does hereby order, judge 
and decree as follow: 
1. No genuine issue exists as to any material fact 
necessary to a resolution of plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff 
Brian Head Ski, Ltd. is entitled to, and is hereby granted, 
judgment as a matter of law. 
2. The Ground Lease at issue was duly terminated 
prior to any alleged offset by payment of taxes or cure by 
defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd., and defendant Brian Head 
Leasing, Ltd,f or any parties claiming through itf have no 
interest in the Property which was formerly subject to the Ground 
Lease. 
3. Ownership of the Building and other improvements 
to the Property reverted to the plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. as 
owner of fee title to the Property upon the termination of the 
Ground Lease. This ruling does not affect ownership of any 
personal property, equipment or trade fixtures in the Building on 
the Property. 
4. Plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. is entitled to all 
rents paid into Court by the former occupant of the Building, on 
the basis that all such rents accrued and were paid subsequent to 
the termination of the Ground Lease. 
5. This Order shall become effective on the date it 
is signed by the Court. 
-2-
DATED this //) day of < = ^ ^ 4 % ^ M 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
34691.Ol/lgm 
zrz%? 2& / 
District Judge 
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JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and 
LARRY G. MOORE (A2305) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
BRIAN HEAD SKI, LTD., a Utah : 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
BRIAN HEAD LEASING, LTD., 
RUSTY'S RESTAURANTS, INC., a 
corporation dba SUNBURST or 
SUNBURST RESTAURANT, and 
RUSSELL AIKEN aka "RUSTY" AIKEN, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Brian Head Ski, Ltd. 
(hereinafter "Plaintiff"'! MUM • 111nu i i <., i MM I r> I I IIW I IH| MUUUI LIIUIIIIII M 
the Court in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant 
to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure against the 
defendants Brian Head Leasin I (Iw -'•••^ftnr "I'll l,oasinij") , 
Rusty's Restaurants, Inc. dba Sunburst Sunburst Restaurant, 
and Russell Aiken aka Rusty Aiken, on the basis that there is no 
genuine issue a material fact necessary to this motion, 
MEMORANDUM OF BRIAN 
HEAD SKI, LTD. IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil . 913000-298 
Judge Braithwaite 
and Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested and judgment 
against defendants as a matter of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment confirming that the 
Ground Lease has been terminated and that BH Leasing has no 
rights in the Property, or the improvements thereon. The 
defendant BH Leasing admits through the deposition of its general 
partner Harold Jensen, Jr. ("Jensen") that it failed to make the 
annual rent payments due under the Ground Lease for twelve 
consecutive years and that it may never have made any payments 
under the Ground Lease. Defendant BH Leasing also admits that it 
received a written notice of its default under the Ground Lease, 
and that it made no effort to cure the default within the time 
period required. Nearly three months after the termination of 
the Ground Lease and the filing of this lawsuit, Jensen sent a 
personal check purporting to cure BH Leasing's default, which 
check was refused. BH Leasing's sole defense to its obligation 
to pay rent, was a claim of "offsets" due to alleged obligations 
of BH Enterprises in the form of unpaid loans allegedly made by 
Harold Jensen to Burton Nichols, or unpaid rents and taxes 
allegedly due from the original BH Enterprises. These alleged 
offsets are invalid under both Federal Bankruptcy law, and under 
Utah law, for the reasons set forth below. 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
, tember i, 2 9 3 8, Br Ian Head 
Enterprises, Inc. (I!BH Enterprises") , entered into a Ground Lease 
Agreement (the "Ground Lease") with defendant BH Leasing* A c i 
nil I IIIP fiT'ouml I a; i"" I1 i")! eement Jb iiLLaclieiJ a,1,. Exhibit ,f +"o the 
Affidavit of James Trees ("Trees Affidavit") , The Ground Lease 
related to that certain real property described in Exhibit: 
the Trees Affida* operty1 ) (Jensen Dep. pp. 15-16) 
the Property is constructed a seasonal snack 
bar and fast food restaurant for the Brian Head Ski Resort. 
( A f f 1 <iii, v [ I «ml .It fill ""I"! e t i s p p , 'I | 
The Ground Lease provided, among other 
obligations, that BH Leasing pay to the ground ]p^rm ,I •• 
Hundred Dollars. 'Tensen Dep. Ex. "1") 
BH Leasing failed to p«-. ;he annual rent due .^.o 
the ground lessor as required 
consecu tive years. (Jensen Dep. pp. 28-29) 
or about Novembei 198 6 an involuntary 
Chapter / oankruptcy petition i was ; ' fiqanpii HI1 Kntei ,,, ,^ : , 
various creditors. In December of 1987, BH Enterprises agreed 
convert the case to a Chapter : bankruptcy denominated as In re: 
Brian Head Enterprises, Inc \ i I n 
the United States Bankruptcy Court - District of Utah. 
(Disclosure Statement On Joint Consolidated Plan of 
Reorganization ^ Unsecu: <.-.;., . _t ,r- s 
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Committee", hereinafter ("Disclosure Statement") p. 3). A copy 
of the disclosure Statement is attached to the Trees Aff. as 
Exhibit "E". 
6. On August 15, 1990, after notice and a hearing, 
the Bankruptcy Court signed an "Order Confirming Joint 
Consolidated Plan of Reorganization of Trustee and Official 
Unsecured Creditor's Committee" (the "Order"), which approved the 
Plan of Reorganization dated as of May 22, 1990 (the "Plan"). 
True and correct copies of the Order and the Plan are attached as 
Exhibits "C" and "D", respectively, to the Trees Affidavit, 
7. BH Leasing purports to be a limited partnership, 
however there is no evidence of the filing of a certificate of 
limited partnership in Utah or California, and BH Leasing has not 
filed any tax returns, (Jensen Dep. pp. 6-8) Harold Jensen, Jr. 
("Jensen") is the sole general partner of BH Leasing and acts as 
the managing general partner. (Jensen Dep. p. 8) Jensen was 
also a stockholder and director of the co-debtor in bankruptcy, 
Brian Head Corporation. Jensen testified he doesn,t know if he 
was a stockholder of BH Enterprises, although he did receive 
shares in BH Enterprises from Burton Nichols. (Jensen Dep. pp. 
11-12) 
8. On or about July 26, 1991, notice was given by 
certified mail return receipt requested to BH Leasing (through 
its general partner Jensen) by and on behalf of the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy for BH Enterprises, that BH Leasing was in default of 
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its obligations under the Ground Lease, and that BH Leasing's 
rights under the Ground Lease would be terminated without further 
ed and payment made within three 
days after service of said notice upon BH Leasing. (Jensen Dep. 
pp. 31-33, Ex. » 
L'.'fii in I intwledged receipt of the certified 
mailing of the notice on Jul y 30,.1991. (Jensen Dep. Ex. ) 
The said notice was also posted upon the Property 
(Complc 
I I BH Leasing made no attempt to cure the default 
within the time period specified i n the notice and Jensen > = - o 
"answei ui: explana .. - H I H n^ +- (Jensen Dep i . 3?) 
12 Since BH Leasing failed to cure the default within 
the time period specified in the notii:^ this action was 
August confirm that BH Leasing's rights under the 
Ground Lease were terminated, and that BH Leasing and any 
subtenants of BH Leasing were :i i I i 11 I 1 a\ rfI i] de 1: ai ner of 1:1 :t 
Property. 
about October 1991 and subsequent to the 
termination ui une Ground Lease, m.ul I hi'i ppr&o, . 
ormer trustee in bankruptcy. That check arrived months 
subsequent to the termination * : the Ground Lease, and waf 
refused, and the check was not, L u-i. 
(Jensen Dep. p ; w Trees Aff. •.-. 14) 
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14. Jensen has claimed a right of "offset" in that in 
the "early 1980's" he alleged that he personally loaned 
approximately $25,000 to Burton Nichols or BH Enterprises, but 
that he does not remember the exact amount. The alleged loan was 
not evidenced by any note or writing, and was not secured by any 
lien or collateral. (Jensen Dep. pp. 13-14) 
15. Jensen has also claimed an "offset" due to two 
certain undocumented loans or advances of uncertain amount (total 
less than $10,000) in approximately 1983 or 1984, one of which 
was allegedly to provide earnest money for an unrelated property 
purchase and one of which was "to purchase partnership shares or 
something like that". (Jensen Dep. pp. 38-39) 
16. Concurrently with the execution of the Ground 
Lease in 1978# the original BH Enterprises (as contrasted with 
the "Reorganized Debtor" under the Plan) entered into a building 
lease for a term of five years with BH Leasing, and then 
subleased the building to a third party. (Jensen Dep. pp. 35-37) 
Jensen and/or BH Leasing claim a right of offset based on rents 
and property taxes which should have been paid by BH Enterprises 
under the alleged building lease or other agreements. (Jensen 
Dep. p. 35) 
17. Jensen and BH Leasing were aware of the BH 
Enterprises bankruptcy, and received numerous notices from the 
Bankruptcy Court. (Jensen Dep. pp. 14-15) Jensen was represented 
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and appeared through Jeqal counsel A\ I lit1 P^ ni inntry Court 
hearing on confirmation of the Plan. (Order i 1) 
18, With respect to the alleged offsets set forth in 
Statements of Fact, J.<* ihrough 
claim with the Bankruptcy Court with respect the amounts e 
claimed BH Enterprises or Burton Nichols owed him, (Jensen Dep. 
pp. 40) 
1° Although BH Leasing was aware of the BH 
Enterprises bankruptcy through its sole general partner Jensen, 
::i !:: :::i :li ::i i :i ::: I:: f j ] = a i ty j : :i : • :: :: f • ::  >f ::: It a :i in c 1 a : i iici :i i v j a n i of fse t (c 
anything else), nor was BH Leasing listed oii the Schedule of 
Creditors as being owed money by BH Enterprises, or as having a 
\ • I r i n?i < 11 j ,i ) n *. f Pi 11 I' 111 i i 111 • i r i s • ( 0 1 d e i >. \ \ i 1 1" I ) 
2U, Pursuant to the Plan and Order, the original 
debtor BH Enterprises was "reorganized" reconstituted as 
Brian Head iTiterpi 1st1",, I'm i I In1 keorgan . _ e i Debtoi ") , whose 
stock was owned by the secured creditors of the former BH 
Enterprises. (Disclosure Statement Article IX, ; Plan p. 
Paragraph 3 2 of the Order provides that 
Upon entry of the Confirmation Order. 
the terms of the Plan will be binding upon 
the Debtor, the reorganized Debtor, and any 
and all creditors and equity security holders 
of the Debtor, whether or not the claims or 
interests of such creditors or equity 
security holders are impaired under the plan 
" ' whether or not such creditors or equity 
-7-
security holders have accepted the Plan, 
(emphasis added.) 
The Order was entered August 17, 1990. (Order p.14) 
22. Pursuant to paragraph M of the Order, the alleged 
"offsets" claimed by BH Leasing (and/or Jensen) were 
"discharged". Such paragraph provides as follows: 
Effective on the confirmation date of 
the Plan, the Debtor (BH Enterprises) is 
discharged from any claim and debt (as that 
term is defined in Section 101(11) of the 
Bankruptcy Code), and, as a result of entry 
of this Order, Section 1141(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the Debtor's liability 
in respect thereof is extinguished 
completely, whether reduced to judgment or 
not, liguidated or unliquidated, contingent 
or noncontingent, asserted or unasserted, 
fixed or not, matured or unmatured, disputed 
or undisputed, legal or equitable, known or 
unknown, that arose from any agreement of the 
Debtor entered into or obligation of the 
Debtor incurred before the Confirmation Date, 
or from any conduct of the Debtor prior to 
the Confirmation Date, or that otherwise 
arose before the Confirmation Date, 
including, without limitation, all interest, 
if any, on any such debts, whether such 
interest accrued before or after the date of 
commencement of the Case, and from any 
liability of a kind specified in section 502 
of the Bankruptcy Code, whether or not a 
proof of claim is filed or deemed filed under 
section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code, whether 
such claim is allowed under section 502 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, or the holder of such 
claim has accepted the Plan. (emphasis 
added.) 
23. Pursuant to paragraph N of the Order, BH Leasing, 
Jensen and all other creditors of BH Enterprises, were 
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permanently enjoined from asserting rights of offset against BH 
Enterprises • - I i.ir a y r a p h 1» < »w »«.k>«. 
N. . . .all Persons who have held or may 
hold Claims (as defined in the Plan) against 
. . . the Debtor . . . or interests in 
property of the Debtor or of the Debtor's 
estate are permanently enjoined on and after 
the Confirmation Date (1) from commencing or 
continuing in any manner any action or other 
proceeding of any kind with respect to such 
Claim or interest against the Debtor, the 
Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan), 
the property of the Debtor, or the property 
of the Reorganized Debtor; . . . (4) from 
asserting any setoff, right of subrogation, 
or recoupment of any kind against any 
obligation due the Debtor or the Reorganized 
Debtor; and (5) from any act, in any manner, 
in any place whatsoever, that does not 
conform to or comply with the provisions of 
the Plan. (emphasis added,) 
Pursuant t paragraph 68 of the Plan, after uae 
Reorganized Debtor had the 
power to sell all of the property free and clear of all liens and 
interests, with liens and interest's to attach to tne ^ceeds of 
such . "Consummation Date" o. the Plan 
was May 31. ;: *:-. (Plan ; 
25. * . ' " , the piaintiff as as^tqi P-
Briaii * ; ondomii Development Corporation, acquired 
all of assets (but not the liabilities) of the Brian Head Ski 
Resort. Included in those assets was the fee t:J t] e I I: 
Proper! essor's interest in the previously terminated 
Ground Lease, (Trees Aff p •} 
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26. The Property and the lessor's interest in the 
Ground Lease were purchased from the Reorganized Debtor pursuant 
to the Plan. Pursuant to paragraph 68 of the Plan, the sale of 
the Property and the lessor's interest in the terminated Ground 
Lease was "Free and clear of liens and interests, with liens and 
interests, as affixed by the Plan or the Court, to attach to the 
net proceeds of any such sale". 
27. Plaintiff paid in excess of $6,000,000 for such 
assets, which included the fee title to the Property and the 
lessor's interest in the terminated Ground Lease. As a part of 
such consideration, Plaintiff also paid approximately $55,763.78 
to West One Bank, to obtain a release of a trust deed on the 
building on the Ground Lease Parcel. (Trees Aff. p. 7) 
28. On June 29, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Real 
Party in Interest and Appearance of Counsel in this suit. 
29. The sole means of ingress and egress to the 
Property granted to BH Leasing and any successors, assigns 
customers or invitees in connection with the Ground Lease was a 
twenty-five foot wide easement from the parking lot of the Brian 
Head Ski Resort, directly to the Property. (Trees Aff. p. 16, 
Ex. ,fBM) (Jensen Dep. pp. 48, 49) 
30. The easement, accesses, entrances and exits to the 
building have been used only since 1978. There is no written 
easement or other written document dealing with access, except 
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the easement referred to in the Ground Lease. (Jensen Dep. pp. 
48, 49) 
31. The access utilized during the ski season by BH 
Leasing and its purported sublessee to the Property, are not 
within the easement provided in the Ground Lease and constitute a 
trespass. (Trees Aff. p. 17) 
32. Any alleged possessory rights of Rusty's 
Restaurants, Inc. or the other named defendants as alleged 
••sublessee" of BH Leasing, expired prior to the date hereof at 
the conclusion of the 1992-1993 ski season. (Jensen Dep. pp. 
24-25) 
33. Rusty's Restaurants, Inc. and/or the other named 
defendants purporting to be "sublessees" of BH Leasing have paid 
all rents due for the 1992-1993 ski season into Court pending the 
Court's resolution of this suit. 
34. The Plan provided for payment of all real property 
taxes owed to the Iron County Treasurer with respect to the 
Property and its related improvements from the proceeds of the 
sale of assets by the Reorganized Debtor. (Plan p. 69(4)) At 
the time BH Leasing purported to pay taxes on the Building on the 
Property, the Ground Lease had already been terminated and funds 
were in escrow from Plaintiff's purchase of the Property to pay 
all real property taxes on the Property or the Building. 
Plaintiff paid the 1992 real property taxes on-ftie Property and 
the Building. (Trees Aff p. 7) 
-11-
ARGUMENT 
I. BH Leasing's Claim of Offset Is Invalid and 
Unenforceable because it has been Discharged and because 
Plaintiff Purchased the Property Free and Clear of Liens, 
Interests and Claims Under Federal Bankruptcy Lav. 
The undisputed facts establish that the Ground 
Lease has been terminated due to BH Leasing's admitted failure to 
timely pay ground rents due after receiving notice and 
opportunity to cure, and that ownership of the Property and 
improvements and Building thereon have reverted to Plaintiff, 
unless notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Plan and Order, BH Leasing 
had a valid right of "offset" which fully excused it from payment 
of ground rents. As is obvious from the Statement of Undisputed 
Facts set forth above, no such defense exists because claims of 
offset are discharged, barred, released and enjoined under the 
Plan and Order, and additionally because Plaintiff Purchased the 
Property free and clear of liens, claims and interests. 
A. BH Leasing's alleged "offsets" are discharged, 
barred, released and enjoined under the Bankruptcy Plan and 
Order. 
Despite having actual notice of the Bankruptcy 
through its sole general partner, BH Leasing filed no proof of 
claim in the Bankruptcy asserting that it had a right of offset 
against BH Enterprises, nor was it listed in the Bankruptcy 
Schedules as having any claim against BH Enterprises. Any 
-12-
alleged offset is now barred by failure to file a proof of claim 
and pursuant to the Plan. More importantly, under paragraph M of 
the Order, any alleged "offsets" claimed by BH Leasing are 
"discharged" and "extinguished completely", "whether or not a 
proof of claim is filed • . . or allowed, and whether or not "the 
holder of such claim has accepted the Plan". (Order pp. 12-13) 
Under paragraph N of the Order, BH Leasing was "permanently 
enjoined" from asserting any interest in the real property of the 
Debtor (BH Enterprises) or the Reorganized Debtor, and was 
"permanently enjoined" from asserting any "setoff or right of 
recoupment of any kind against the Debtor (BH Enterprises) or the 
Reorganized Debtor." The position taken by BH Leasing in this 
suit is expressly precluded by the provisions of the Plan, the 
Order, and the Bankruptcy Code, and for that reason alone, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to entry of summary judgment against BH 
Leasing and anyone claiming rights under it. 
B. BH Leasing's alleged offsets and its alleged 
interest under the Ground Lease are not enforceable against the 
Property or Plaintiff because Plaintiff purchased the Property 
free and clear of liens, claims and interests. 
Under the Plan, the assets of BH Enterprises, 
including the Property and the lessor's interest under the 
terminated Ground Lease, vested in the Reorganized Debtor "free 
and clear of liens, claims and interests (Disclosure Statement; 
Plan p. 64) as permitted pursuant to Section 1123(a)(5)(D) and 
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Section 363(b)(1) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Paragraph 68 
of the Plan provided that the Reorganized Debtor had the power 
after the Consummation Date of the Plan (May 31, 1991) to sell 
all of the property and rights of the Reorganized Debtor "free 
and clear of liens and interests", with liens and interest to 
attach to the proceeds of such sale. (Plan p. 30) 
•The Purchase Agreement under which Plaintiff acquired 
the Property and the groundlessor's interest in the terminated 
Ground Lease, expressly provided in paragraphs 6(c) and 7(a), 
that the conveyance of the Property was free and clear of liens 
and encumbrances pursuant to the Plan. (Trees Aff. p. 3). In 
addition, paragraph 4(f) of the Purchase Agreement provided that: 
"Unless specifically agreed in writing, Buyer 
is not assuming or taking subject to any 
liabilities of any nature arising from or 
associated with the Property or arising from 
or accruing due to activities, events, facts 
or circumstances prior to the actual Closing 
Date." 
The Closing Date was May 21, 1992. (Trees Aff. p. 3) The Ground 
Lease had been terminated prior to Plaintiffs purchase of the 
Property. In addition, by virtue of the Plan, Plaintiff 
purchased the Property free and clear of BH Leasing's claim that 
it had an interest in such Property or the Building and 
improvements thereon by virtue of the Ground Lease, and for both 
of these additional independent reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to 
entry of summary judgment. 
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II. BH Leasings alleged payment of taxes on the 
Building do not give rise to a defense to termination of the 
Ground Lease. 
BH Leasing has alleged an offset or defense to 
termination of the Ground Lease in that it asserts that it paid 
property taxes on the Building which should have been paid by BH 
Enterprises. This payment of property taxes was made by Jensen 
by personal check on February 3, 1992 some seven months after the 
Ground Lease had already been terminated in August of 1991. 
Furthermore, as set forth above, under the Bankruptcy Plan and 
Order this claim of offset was both "discharged and enjoined" as 
it allegedly related to an obligation to pay taxes for the years 
1987-1991, and because as set forth above Plaintiff purchased the 
Property (including the Building and improvements which reverted 
to the Reorganized Debtor upon termination of the Ground Lease) 
"without assuming or taking subject to any liabilities of any 
nature arising from or associated with the Property or arising 
from or accruing due to activities, events, facts or 
circumstances prior to the actual Closing Date." The actual 
Closing Date was May 21, 1992. (Trees Aff. p. 3) 
In addition to the foregoing which clearly show that no 
valid "offset" to termination of the Ground Lease exists, the 
payment of taxes by Jensen would not, in any event, create an 
"offset" to ground lease rents due from BH Leasing to BH 
Enterprises, because there is an absence of the "mutuality of 
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obligation" which is a legal pre-requisite to any assertion of 
right of offset. In order to have a valid setoff, reciprocal 
claims must exist between the same parties in the same capacity 
at the same time, 2 0 Am Jur 2d §74; First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 
1980). Jensen is not the same party as BH Leasing, even if he is 
its general partner. His issuance of his personal check for an 
alleged obligation that had already been terminated, creates no 
claim or right whatsoever in BH Leasing. Jensen acted as a 
"volunteer" in paying property taxes on the Building, at a time 
when funds were in escrow to pay such taxes (Trees Aff. p. 7). 
Plaintiff paid the 1992 property taxes on the Building and the 
Property. For all of the reasons set forth above, the alleged 
payment of taxes by Jensen (or even by BH Leasing) is legally 
insufficient to prevent summary judgment. 
III. BH Leasing has not acquired any "prescriptive 
easement", not has it established a "boundary by acquiescence". 
Although the issues of prescriptive easement or 
boundary by acquiescence are legally "moot" since the Ground 
Lease had been terminated, since BH Leasing has raised those 
issues Plaintiff feels compelled to point out that such claims 
are wholly without merit. 
Jensen testified in his deposition that BH Leasing and 
its tenants and subtenants had used the entrances and exists to 
the Building only since 1978. (Jensen Dep. pp. 48-49) Under 
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Utah law, no claim can be made for a prescriptive easement unless 
the use has been continuous for a period in excess of twenty 
years. See Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-12-10 and 
78-12-11(1), and Anderson v. Osouthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah 
1972). And while the doctrine of a "boundary by acquiescence" 
has no relevance whatsoever to a question of whether use of 
•particular ingress and egress locations is legal, Plaintiff would 
also point out that establishment of a property right under that 
doctrine also requires twenty years of continuous acquiescence• 
See Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984) and Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear based on 
the Undisputed Facts set forth above, and the terms of the 
Bankruptcy Court Order and Plan, that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law confirming: that the Ground Lease 
has been previously terminated; that ownership of the Building 
and improvements thereon has thereby reverted to the Plaintiff as 
owner of the Property; and that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
receive all rents which have been paid into Court by the occupant 
of the Property. Plaintiff reserves the right to at a later date 
to seek an award of attorneys' fees against BH Leasing and/or 
Jensen in this Court or the Bankruptcy Court, and to seek civil 
contempt or other sanctions against BH Leasing or its partners in 
Bankruptcy Court. 
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Dated this day of April, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Lan^L-C* Moore 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Brian Head Ski, Ltd, 
25418,01/lgra 
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